| 4<br>5<br>6 | James M. Mulcahy (SBN 213547)<br><i>jmulcahy@mulcahyllp.com</i><br>Kevin A. Adams (SBN 239171)<br><i>kadams@mulcahyllp.com</i><br>Douglas R. Luther (SBN 280550)<br><i>dluther@mulcahyllp.com</i><br>Four Park Plaza, Suite 1230<br>Irvine, California 92614<br>Telephone: (949) 252-9377<br>Facsimile: (949) 252-0090 |                                 |                                       |  |  |
|-------------|--|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| 7<br>8      | Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counter-Defendants  |                                 |                                       |  |  |
| 9           | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT   |                                 |                                       |  |  |
| 10          | CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA   |                                 |                                       |  |  |
| 11          |  |                                 |                                       |  |  |
| 12          | BENNION & DEVILLE FINE   | Case No. 5:15-0                 | CV-01921 R (KKx)                      |  |  |
| 13          | HOMES, INC., a California<br>corporation, BENNION & DEVILLE  | Hon. Manual L                   | . Real                                |  |  |
| 14          | FINE HOMES SOCAL, INC., a  |                                 | RTIES' REPLY IN                       |  |  |
| 15          | California corporation, WINDERMERE<br>SERVICES SOUTHERN  |                                 | MOTION IN LIMINE DE WSC FROM          |  |  |
| 16          | CALIFORNIA, INC., a California   |                                 | NG EVIDENCE OF                        |  |  |
| 17          | corporation,   |                                 | SERVICES SOCAL<br>FIED IN THE NOTICE  |  |  |
| 18          | Plaintiffs,  | OF TERMINA                      |                                       |  |  |
| 19          | V.   | [Motion in Lin                  | nine # 11                             |  |  |
| 20          | · · ·  |                                 |                                       |  |  |
| 21          | WINDERMERE REAL ESTATE   | Date:<br>Time:                  | May 1, 2017                           |  |  |
| 22          | SERVICES COMPANY, a Washington corporation; and DOES 1-10  | Courtroom:                      | 10:00 a.m.<br>880                     |  |  |
| 23          |  |                                 | ~                                     |  |  |
| 24          | Defendant.   | Action Filed:<br>Disc. Cut-Off: | September 17, 2015<br>August 29, 2016 |  |  |
| 25          |  | Pretrial Conf.:                 | November 15, 2016                     |  |  |
| 26          |  | Trial:                          | May 30, 2017                          |  |  |
| 27<br>28    | AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS  |                                 |                                       |  |  |
|             | _]   |                                 |                                       |  |  |

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Bennion & Deville Fine Homes, Inc., Bennion & Deville Fine Homes SoCal, Inc., Windermere Services Southern California, Inc. ("Services SoCal"), and Counter-Defendants Robert L. Bennion and Joseph R. Deville (collectively, the "B&D Parties") respectfully submit this Reply in Support of their Motion in *Limine* No. 1 to preclude Defendant/ Counterclaimant Windermere Real Estate Services Company ("WSC") from introducing any evidence, testimony, argument, or comment that it terminated the Area Representation Agreement with Windermere Services Southern California, Inc. for any reason other than those grounds set forth in the February 26, 2015 notice of termination.

# I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

It is undisputed that the Area Representation Agreement was terminated. Under the contract, the parties could only terminate in one of four ways: (i) at any time by mutual written agreement of the parties (not at issue here); (ii) by either party upon 180 days written notice; (iii) by either party on 90 days written notice if the termination is for cause based upon a material breach of the agreement described in the notice and not cured within 90 days; and (iv) by either party without prior notice in the event of a bankruptcy or other outcomes not relevant here. (Decl. of Joseph "Bob" Deville ISO Motion in *Limine* No. 1 ("Deville Decl."), Ex. A.) The agreement did not allow other means of termination. (*See id.*)

If the contract was terminated without cause, the terminating party must pay the Termination Obligation under § 4.2. (*Id.*) If it was terminated for cause, the terminated party is required to provide written notice describing the alleged breaches, allowing 90 days to cure. (*Id.*) If WSC contends it terminated the Area Representation Agreement for cause, they are limited to the alleged material breaches outlined in its February 26, 2015 notice of termination. (*Id.*, Ex. C.) Alleged breaches beyond that are not relevant, and if allowed, would unfairly prejudice the B&D Parties, and would confuse the jury. Accordingly, as outlined below, the alleged breaches other than those set forth in the February 26, 2015 notice of termination should be excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial

under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403.

## WSC IGNORES THE REASONABLE NOTICE OF TERMINATION FOR CAUSE PRESCRIBED BY THE AGREEMENT TO ARGUE RELEVANCE

### A. <u>The Area Representation Agreement Establishes What Reasonable</u> <u>Notice Is Required To Negate The Termination Obligation</u>

WSC's Opposition conflates two distinct means of termination identified by the Area Representation Agreement in an (erroneous) attempt to establish two distinct forms of reasonable notice. However, under the contract, there is one means of giving reasonable notice of material breaches and opportunity to cure. Under § 4.1(c), any party may terminate upon 90 days written notice "for cause based upon a material breach of the Agreement *described in the notice* and not cured within the ninety (90) day period." (Deville Decl., Ex. A, § 4.2(c) (emphasis added).) The February 26, 2015 notice of termination is the only notice that contains an alleged material breach. (*Id.*, Ex. B, C.) Anything less than that is unreasonable under the contract. Consequently, alleged breaches beyond those in the February 26th letter are irrelevant, and if allowed, would unfairly prejudice the B&D Parties.

### B. <u>Because Services SoCal Is Only Required To Cure Material Breaches</u> <u>In The Written Notice, The Alleged Breaches Beyond Those Are</u> <u>Irrelevant</u>

Under § 4.1(c) of the Area Representation Agreement, any party may terminate upon 90 days written notice "for cause based upon a material breach of the Agreement *described in the notice* and not cured within the ninety (90) day period." (Deville Decl., Ex. A, § 4.2(c) (emphasis added).) On February 26, 2015, WSC terminated the Area Representation Agreement, listing as the lone "material breach," Services SoCal's alleged "fail[ure] to collect and/or remit license and technology fees from licensees in [Services SoCal's] area." (*Id.*, Ex. C.) Because this was the only breach identified in WSC's notice of termination, any other grounds WSC's termination of the Area Representation Agreement are not relevant to the instant dispute. Services SoCal contends it did not breach of the agreement. At trial, if the jury decides that Services

II.

SoCal did not breach the agreement as alleged in the February 26, 2015 notice, then the termination was without cause. As a result, Services SoCal is entitled to the Termination Obligation under § 4.2 of the agreement.

In its opposition, WSC concedes that the alleged breaches other than those set forth in the February 26, 2015 notice of termination are only relevant to deciding whether Services SoCal is entitled to the Termination Obligation under § 4.2 of the Area Representation Agreement. (Oppo. to the B&D Parties' Motion in Limine No. 1 ("Oppo."), at 3-6.) As outlined below, because WSC characterized its January 28th notice of termination as "without cause," any alleged breaches are irrelevant to Services SoCal's entitlement to the Termination Obligation under § 4.2.

#### C. <u>Because The January 28th Termination Was Without Cause, WSC</u> <u>Cannot Claim That The Additional Alleged Breaches Are Relevant</u>

Under § 4.1(b), either party may terminate upon 180 days written notice to the other party. (Decl. of Joseph R. "Bob" Deville ISO Motion in Limine No. 1 ("Deville Decl."), Ex. A, §§ 4.1(b).) Where a party terminates pursuant to § 4.1(b), the Terminated Party is entitled to "be paid an amount equal to the fair market value of the Terminated Party's interest in the Agreement" ("Termination Obligation"). (Deville Decl., Ex. A, § 4.2.) However, there is no Termination Obligation if the termination is "based upon the material breach of the obligations of the Terminated Party . . . continuing *after reasonable notice and opportunity to cure*." (*Id*.) On January 28, 2015, terminated the Area Representation Agreement pursuant to § 4.1(b), setting the date of termination on July 28, 2015. (Deville Decl., Ex. B.) Importantly, in its February 26, 2015 notice of termination, discussed *supra*, *WSC's counsel characterized the January 28th termination as "without cause."* (Deville Decl., Ex. C.) Specifically, the February 26th letter states:

On January 28, 2015, WSC provided [WSSC] with notice of termination . . . As you are aware, paragraph 4.1 of the Agreement provides that either party may terminate the Agreement *without cause* upon 180 days' notice. The Agreement will, therefore, *terminate without cause on July 28, 2015*. [¶] Without waiver of WSC's right to terminate the

Agreement *without cause*, this letter constitutes notice of WSC's intent to terminate the Agreement with cause due to [Services SoCal's] material breach of the Agreement.

(Emphasis added.) Because WSC's January 28th termination is without cause, therefore, Services SoCal is entitled to the Termination Obligation.

Even if the Court interprets the Area Representation Agreement to require a lesser form of notice than that outlined in § 4.1(c) (it should not), WSC itself characterized its termination under § 4.1(b) as without cause. For WSC to be relieved of its obligation to pay Services SoCal the Termination Obligation, Services SoCal must fail to cure material breaches of which it had reasonable notice. (Deville Decl., Ex. A, § 4.2.) WSC characterized its January 28th notice as termination without cause. This negates any possible reasonable notice required for Services SoCal to cure. WSC cannot now attempt to re-characterize its January 28th notice of termination. The alleged breaches are not relevant to adjudicating whether Services SoCal is entitled to the Termination Obligation under § 4.2.

The B&D Parties anticipate that WSC will conflate the two distinct means of termination outlined above just like the Opposition does here. WSC mixes the analysis of Services SoCal's entitlement to the Termination Obligation—relevant only to the January 28th notice—with the analysis of Services SoCal's opportunity to cure the alleged breach in the February 28th notice. In so doing, WSC misleads the Court, as it would the jury, into an incorrect analysis of Services SoCal's entitlement under § 4.2. Because the alleged breaches are not relevant, would only be substantially prejudicial to the B&D Parties, and would confuse the jury, WSC should be precluded from attempting to introduce any evidence, testimony, argument, or comment that it terminated the Area Representation Agreement for any reason other than those grounds set forth in the February 26, 2015 notice of termination.

#### III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

For the reasons stated above, and those outlined in the moving documents, the B&D Parties respectfully request that the Court enter an order precluding WSC from

| 1       | attempting to introduce any evidence, testimony, argument, or comment that it        |             |   |  |  |
|---------|--|-------------|---|--|--|
| 2       | terminated the Area Representation Agreement for any reason other than those grounds |             |   |  |  |
| 3       | set forth in the February 26, 2015 notice of termination.                            |             |   |  |  |
| 4       |  |             |   |  |  |
| 5       | Dated: April 17, 2017  | MULCAHY LLP |   |  |  |
| 6       |  |             |   |  |  |
| 7       |  | By:         | <u>/s/ Kevin A. Adams</u><br>Kevin A. Adams     |  |  |
| 8       |  |             | Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counter-Defendants |  |  |
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